The Real Exchange Rate, Foreign Aid and Macroeconomic Transmission Mechanisms in Tanzania and Ghana by Juselius, Katarina et al.
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
The Real Exchange Rate, Foreign Aid and Macroeconomic Transmission Mechanisms
in Tanzania and Ghana
Juselius, Katarina; Reshid, Abdulaziz Abrar; Tarp, Finn
Publication date:
2014
Citation for published version (APA):
Juselius, K., Reshid, A. A., & Tarp, F. (2014). The Real Exchange Rate, Foreign Aid and Macroeconomic
Transmission Mechanisms in Tanzania and Ghana. Kbh.: Økonomisk institut, Københavns Universitet.
University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online), No. 02, Vol.. 2014
Download date: 03. Feb. 2020
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2398929 
Discussion Papers 
Department of Economics 
University of Copenhagen 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark 
Tel.: +45 35 32 30 01 – Fax: +45 35 32 30 00 
http://www.econ.ku.dk 
 
 
ISSN: 1601-2461 (E) 
 
 
No. 14-02 
 
 
 
The Real Exchange Rate, Foreign Aid and  
Macroeconomic Transmission Mechanisms in Tanzania and Ghana 
 
 
Katarina Juselius, Abdulaziz Reshid & Finn Tarp 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2398929 
The Real Exchange Rate, Foreign Aid and
Macroeconomic Transmission Mechanisms in
Tanzania and Ghana
Katarina Juselius,1 Abdulaziz Reshid,2and Finn Tarp,3
Abstract
A recent study of 36 Sub Saharan African countries found a positive impact of aid
in the absolute majority of these countries. However, for Tanzania and Ghana, two
major aid recipients, aid did not seem to have been equally benecial. This paper
singles out these two countries for a more detailed empirical investigation. The focus is
now on the e¤ect of aid when allowing external and nominal facors to play a role in the
maccroeconomic transmission mechanism. We conclude that aid played a signicantly
positive - but very di¤erent - role in the two countries. Due in part to generous aid
inows Tanzania experienced positive investment and GDP growth from the late 1960s
to 2007. But, until the mid-1980s, the impact of aid on growth was well below its
potential as the large inows of aid facilitated a serious overappreciation of the real
exchange rate. In Ghana, declining aid in the 1970s was associated with lacking growth
while the reactivation of aid ows in the 1980s supported an economic rebound. When
monetary and external factors are properly accounted for, we nd that aid has been
pivotal to growth in both real GDP and investment.
1 Introduction
Recent studies of the impact of foreign aid on economic development tend to nd a positive
impact of aid on growth. This reects both better and longer data and more careful method-
ological choices, and includes work based on the application of modern time series techniques.
Such work was not feasible just a few years ago due to inadequacy of relevant time-series in-
formation in individual aid recipient countries. Juselius, Møller and Tarp (2013) (henceforth
JMT13) is such a study. It provides a comprehensive overview of the long-run impact of
foreign aid on a set of key macrovariables (GDP, investment, government expenditure, and
private consumption, all in real terms) in 36 Sub-Saharan countries from the 1960s to 2007.
JMT13 relies on a Cointegrated VAR (CVAR) approach, and in the absolute majority
of countries (32) aid has clear and positive e¤ects on either GDP or investment, or both.
The cases where aid appears to have had no or even negative e¤ects amount to a very small
minority of outlying countries. However, Ghana and Tanzania, two major aid recipients,
1. University of Copenhagen, email: Katarina.Juselius@econ.ku.dk; 2. Lineaus University, email: abdu-
laziz.abrar@lnu.se; and 3. UNU-WIDER and University of Copenhagen, email: tarp@wider.unu.edu
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belong to the latter. They have over the years inuenced much of the literature and debate
about economic development in Africa, including the role of foreign aid and, therefore, merit
attention. The overall scope of the present study is exactly this, i.e. to start from JMT13,
dig deeper and try to uncover whether the JMT13 ndings as regards Ghana and Tanzania
hold up when the implications of the assumptions underlying JMT13 are subjected to careful
scrutiny.
The broad selection of variables in JMT13 restricted the analysis to closed economy
e¤ects. Accordingly, their results reect a ceteris paribus assumption, where open economy
inuences are kept constant. In addition, only real variables were included in the JMT13
empirical model, which implies that nominal and real variables were treated as dichotomous.
We wish to go further here and also note that, in e¤ect, the ceteris paribus assumption
in JMT13 comprises a very large number of variables and factors, such as country specic
characteristics. Some of these are likely to have had signicant impact on the economy. It
is for example, well established that structural reforms, other policy interventions, conicts,
and droughts and oods may result in very large changes in the macrovariables under study
and, therefore, can be highly inuential for the estimated results (Nielsen, 2008). Unless
adequately controlled for, they will tend to bias the model parameter estimates.
JMT13 did model extraordinary events such as those mentioned, using step dummies to
account for equilibrium mean shifts in the long-run relations, on the one hand, and impulse
dummies to account for extraordinary shocks in the equations, on the other. Accordingly,
all major events were indeed controlled for. Nevertheless, the large number (36) of countries
involved prevented a more detailed analysis of all possible events. The present study lls
this gap, paying particular attention to understanding the long- and short-run e¤ects of the
series of major political and economic events that a¤ected developments in the two countries,
including major structural reforms that have played a key role in both countries.
Finally, while JMT13 focused on uncovering the causal links between aid and the macrovari-
ables and on the long-run impact of a shock to aid (measurable with some simple test
statistics and therefore comparable over countries), the JMT13 study did not address the
dynamics of the transmission mechanism of aid. This is an econometrically much more com-
plex and demanding challenge, which is better pursued in a two-country comparative case
context.
In sum, JMT13 provided an overview based on a number of simplifying assumptions.
They were used because of the nature of the very large and comprehensive sample of countries
and variables, not because the assumptions were inherently plausible per se. In addition, a
series of events were controlled for in a stylized manner. It is on this background of interest
to establish whether two major African aid recipients, Ghana and Tanzania, turned out as
outliers due to omitted variable e¤ects or whether these two countries are in some sense
special. In the latter case, we wish to understand why. More specically, the aim of this
study is to respond to three key concrete questions:
1. What was the e¤ect of major structural reforms on the macroeconomic growth rates
in Ghana and Tanzania, do the e¤ects di¤er, and if so why?
2. Does the inclusion of the real exchange rates (open economy e¤ects) and the ination
rate (nominal e¤ects) signicantly alter conclusions regarding the long-run impact of
aid on key macroeconomic variables in Tanzania and Ghana?
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3. Are the macroeconomic transmission mechanisms in Ghana and Tanzania similar (and
if so to which extent) or are they di¤erent; and what is the potential role played by
Dutch disease?
2 Historical Overview
Given our focus on the role of foreign aid, the real exchange rate and ination for the
determination of real GDP, investment and consumption in Tanzania and Ghana, we provide
in Figures 1 - 4 an overview of the historical developments in these seven series over the
period of investigation (1968-2009). Figures 1 and 3 describe GDP, aggregate investment,
private consumption and government expenditure (all in real terms), and Figures 2 and
4, show o¢ cial foreign assistance (ODA), and the real dollar exchange and ination rates.
All variables are in logarithmic values. A rst observation is that ve variables (GDP, aid,
consumption, investment and government expenditure) are distinctly trending, whereas the
remaining two variables (ination and the real exchange rate) do not exhibit linear trends,
except very locally.
An overriding thesis here is that persistent deviations from long-run trends are very
helpful in understanding the historical dynamics of macroeconomic transmission mechanisms
and the role of foreign aid. Such deviations from long-run paths usually indicate imbalances
in underlying economic structures and are, arguably, very informative in trying to uncover
the impact of adopted economic policy and other changes. For this reason we need to study
both long-run trends in the data, on the one hand, and deviations from these trends, on the
other. The Cointegrated VAR model, to be introduced in the next section, is tailor-made to
study such features of the data.
2.1 Tanzania
Tanzania became independent in 1961 and the rst period after the transition from colonial
rule di¤ers markedly from subsequent periods. The years 1961-67 are therefore unlikely to
be informative in our analysis and have been omitted. Accordingly we begin in 1967 where
president Nyerere took over as President. The Tanzanian government also endorsed the
1967 Arusha declaration, marking a shift towards a centrally controlled socialist model of
development emphasizing self-reliance, nationalization of key economic sectors, villagization
of production (known as Ujamaa) and public provision of health and education (Rotarou
and Ueta, 2009). In 1973 a National Price commission was established to facilitate price
control; a managed exchange rate system was introduced; rural marketing cooperatives were
abolished and replaced by a monopoly marketing board; over 7 million people were reset-
tled forcefully under the Ujamaa villagization programme; and the Basic Industrialization
Strategy (BIS) introduced state-led investment programmes which were largely nanced by
foreign aid (Potts, 2005 and Bigsten and Danielsson, 1999). As public expenditure increased
and due to a growing bureaucracy, the government became increasingly dependent on donor
support, and foreign aid nanced nearly half of Tanzanias import bill in this period (Van
Arkadie, 1995). During 1973-75, net ODA more than doubled from USD 441 to 1,044 million
annually according to OECD/DAC.
Figure 1(a) shows that real GDP grew along a stable path until the end of the 1970s, but
behind the seemingly stable growth rates there were signs of mounting structural problems.
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Figure 1: The time path of Tanzanian (a) log real GDP, (b) log real investment, (c) log real
private consumption and (d) log real government expenditure.The log scale can be translated
to relative changes over the period as follows: real GDP increased 5.7 times, real investment
8.2, real private consumption 4.5 times, and real government expenditure 7.3 times.
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Policies undertaken after 1973 had increased the role of the state beyond its administrative
capacity leading to ine¢ ciency and under-utilization of resources (Potts, 2005). High mark-
ups in government marketing monopolies and a strongly overvalued exchange rate reduced
the returns from exports, and state-led government investment programmes and import
substitution strategies increased the structural dependency on imported inputs and foreign
aid (Van Arkadie, 1995). A temporary co¤ee boom and substantial donor support helped
postpone the crisis (Bigsten and Danielsson, 1999), but the ensuing crisis at the end of the
1970s was aggravated by external factors such as the 1979 oil price rise, the Uganda conict
(1978-79) and a serious drought (1981-82).
Foreign aid was exceptionally high from 1972-1981, more than twice its long-run trend
value. Thereafter aid inows started declining (Figure 2a). The original generosity by
donor countries was to a large extent associated with the president Nyerere, a well educated
and charismatic leader. In particular the Nordic countries were prepared to give Nyereres
socialist experiment a realistic chance. Because of the mounting structural problems in
the economy, IMF and the donors increased their pressure for more drastic liberalization
measures in the early 1980s. As the government initially refused to cooperate on these
reforms, aid ows started declining. As a result, Tanzania experienced a shortage of imported
inputs and a declining GDP, but in spite of tensions between donors and the government,
aid remained above its long-run trend until mid-1990s.
The large inows of aid during the Nyerere era did not result in proportional growth in
income. Figure 1a shows that GDP closely followed its long-run growth path although foreign
aid had doubled. An important reason why real GDP did not grow more can be related to
the very strong appreciation of the Tanzanian shilling in the Nyerere period (Figure 2b).
That the Tanzanian shilling was seriously overvalued can for example be inferred from the
black market rate which shows that the dollar was traded at prices dramatically above the
o¢ cial rate. For Nyerere maintaining a strong currency was a sign of prestige (and possibly
as a way to avoid imported ination), and he refused to devalue the shilling in spite of
strong pressure by the IMF, the donor countries and internal analysts. No doubt, the strong
appreciation of the shilling tended to o¤set the benets of the generous aid.
At the end of the 1970s, the early promising years were denitely over. Investment
declined dramatically as a result of lost competitiveness due to the overvalued shilling and
declining aid (Figure 2a). GDP dropped below its long-term growth path (Figure 1a) and so
did government expenditure (Figure 1d) albeit less than investment and GDP. As monetary
expansion was used to compensate for the declining aid, ination started increasing (Figure
2c). By insisting on a strong shilling in a period of structural weaknesses Nyerere missed a
golden opportunity to exploit the generous aid as a means to putting Tanzania on a high
growth path. Instead, Tanzania entered into a prolonged structural adjustment period with
GDP growth rates below those of the 1970s.
The rst Structural Adjustment Programme implemented in 1983-1985 reected a home-
owned e¤ort to liberalize the economy. It included measures such as (i) import liberalization
through an own fund import scheme, (ii) depreciation of the Tanzanian shilling, (iii)
freezing the budget decit at the previous level, and (iv) liberalization of the trade with
domestic food products (Van Arkadie, 1995 and Wobst, 2001). Although the programme
resulted in a (modest) reversal of the negative trends in real output growth and domestic
investment, the high ination and the deteriorating balance of payments continued. Also the
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Figure 2: The time path of Tanzanian (a) log aid, (b) log real exchange rate, and (c) log
ination rate. The log scale can be translated to relative changes over the period as follows:
aid grew 10 times, the real exchange rate devalued around 4.3 times its value in 1985, and
ination was roughly 35% at its highest.
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parallel market economy increased in scope. Yet, the home-owned reform measures signaled
a major shift towards economic liberalization.
After Ali Hassan Mwinyi took over the presidency from Joseph Nyerere in 1985, nego-
tiations with IMF resumed. President Mwinyi agreed to implement signicant stabilization
and structural adjustment policies under the Economic Recovery Programmes (1986-1993)
(Agrawal et al., 1993). While economic growth recovered to some extent, per capita growth
remained modest and even negative in some years. Not until 1996 was the turmoil of the
Nyerere period followed by more sustainable growth (Figure 1a).
After the devaluation of the shilling in 1985, the gap between the parallel and the o¢ cial
market rates narrowed from its peak of 800% in 1985 to only 30% in early 1992 (Bigsten
and Danielsson, 1999). The National Investment Promotion and Protection Act of 1990,
which provided incentives and guarantees to foreign investors (in particular for gold and
petroleum exploration) and two legal acts in 1991 and 1992, which allowed free entry and
exit for foreign banks, made foreign investment more attractive, especially in gold mining
(Cooksey and Kelsall, 2011). Furthermore, the high ination rates of the 1980s declined to
single digits after 1996 (Figure 2d).
In 1995 Benjamin Mkapa became president, and the government intensied the liberaliza-
tion process. An agreement was signed with the IMF on an Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility for the period 1998/99 to 2000/01, and the liberalization of trade and nance in-
tensied. The exchange rate was allowed to oat and various reforms a¤ecting the civil
service and tax collection were undertaken. These reforms were accompanied by increasing
aid. Since then economic performance has been strong, the relationship with donors usually
good, and Tanzania has continued to be one of the major recipients of foreign aid.1
It is fairly remarkable that over this turbulent period private consumption did not show
much variation around its long-run path (Figure 2c). A possible explanation (in addition to
data collection challenges) is that the majority of the population continued to live at or close
to subsistence levels without much scope for either increases or decreases in consumption
patterns.
2.2 Ghana
Political and economic developments in post-Independence Ghana (see Aryeetey, Harrigan
and Nissanke, 2000; Aryeetey and Kanbur, 2008) have been quite di¤erent from those of
Tanzania, albeit with some similarities. The graphs of the seven time series in Figures
3 and 4 illustrate this. A remarkable feature is that among the variables included only
government expenditure exhibited long-term growth over the full sample period (Figure 3d).
Real GDP, investment and consumption exhibited growth only after the introduction of
structural reforms in 1983 (Figures 3a, 3b and 3c).
The pre-reform period was politically unstable with frequent military coups and counter
coups contributing to gross economic mismanagement and a deteriorating investment cli-
mate. The economy was muddling throughwith ine¢ cient state owned enterprises oper-
ating with excess capacity. The consequence was low productivity, an over-valued currency,
high ination rates, large public decits, and high interest rates (Leechor, 1994 and Aryeetey
and Tarp, 2000). In most of the pre-1983 period, economic policy focused on import substitu-
1See Nord et al. (2009) and World Bank (2001) for further background.
7
Log re a l G DP
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
Log re a l inv es tm e nt
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
-0.8
-0.4
-0.0
0.4
0.8
Log re a l priv a te  c ons um ption
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
Log re a l gov e rnm e nt e x pe nditure
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Figure 3: The time path of Ghanaian (a) log real GDP, (b) log real investment, (c) log
real private consumption and (d) log real government expenditure. The log scale can be
translated to relative changes over the sample period as follows: real GDP increased 3.5
times, real investment 2.7 times, real private consumption 3.5 times, and real government
expenditure 4.5 times.
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tion, exchange rate and price controls with the State strongly present in most macroeconomic
activities (Aryeetey, Fosu and Bawumia, 2001).
Foreign aid dropped quite signicantly in the early 1970s (Figure 4a) when President
Acheampong (who was later to be executed in 1979) announced that Ghana repudiated its
international debts. Thus, in contrast to Nyereres Tanzania, Ghana was very far from be-
ing a donor darling. But similar to Tanzania, the Ghanaian cedi was allowed to appreciate
very strongly during the 1970s and until 1983 (Figure 4b). The long period of persistent
appreciation combined with very high ination rates had a disastrous e¤ect on real invest-
ments which exhibited a declining trend until 1983 (Figure 3b). Also private consumption
stagnated, and even declined in some years in stark contrast to government expenditures.
Annual ination rates soared reaching more than 100% (Figure 4c) as a result of government
decit nancing by excessive expansion of the money supply. Also exogenous factors such as
the 1983 drought and the return of millions of Ghanaian workers from Nigeria contributed
to the severe economic crisis at the beginning of the 1980s (Fosu and Aryeetey, 2008).
Because of deteriorating terms of trade Ghana was literally forced to change its economic
policies and turned to the IMF and the World Bank for assistance in 1983. The result
was the IMF Economic Recovery Programme (1983-1985) focussing on stabilization and
liberalization of various sectors of the economy by exchange rate adjustments (increasing the
dollar price by 250% in 1983), stringent scal and monetary policies, trade liberalization,
civil service and public sector reforms, and privatization of government owned enterprises.
The programme had impact. The annual rate of ination declined from more than 100%
in the pre-reform period to about 25% in the late 1980s and rst half of 1990s after which
it nally came down to the present low levels. Foreign aid increased substantially (Figure
4a) easing external nancial constraints and promoting a higher economic growth path, and
possibly also the relatively high ination rates during the rst reform period, as the aid was
mostly spent on the domestic economy (Leechor, 1994).
The economic reforms combined with increasing aid resulted in a strong recovery. The
pre-reform period with no real growth was replaced with steady growth in all macro-variables.
This success became identied with the long-serving Finance Minister, Dr. Kwesi Botchwey.
With his departure in the mid-1990s, the earlier cohesiveness in the Ghanaian reforms seemed
to be temporarily a¤ected. The reform process slowed down, and with the introduction of
multiparty democracy in the early-1990s, Ghana experienced her rst political-economic
business cycle. In 1995 the government attempted to introduce a value-added tax reform
without su¢ ciently involving the Ghanaian people. The resulting civil disturbances forced
the government to withdraw the tax which, after a broader information campaign, was
reintroduced three years later, now at 10% rather than the originally proposed 15% (see
Tsikata, 2001). However, since 1996 macroeconomic conditions have overall been relatively
stable and real GDP has steadily grown at rates faster than in most other Sub-Saharan
African countries. In parallel, Ghana has become one of Africas success growth stories.
3 Growth and Structural Reforms in Tanzania and Ghana Com-
pared
Both Tanzania and Ghana experienced a long period of currency appreciation in the 1970s,
and both initiated economic reforms in the beginning of the 1980s due to deteriorating eco-
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Figure 4: The time path of Ghanaian (a) log aid, (b) log real exchange rate, and (c) log
ination rate. The log scale can be translated to relative changes over the period as follows:
aid grew 4.5 times, the real exchange rate devalued around 14 times its value in 1982, and
ination was roughly 120% at its highest.
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nomic conditions. A very strong devaluation in the mid-1980s was also as a major step to
regain economic growth in both cases. While there are many similarities there are also sig-
nicant di¤erences between the two cases.2 In Tanzania the harmful e¤ects of the continuing
appreciation in the 1970s were to a large degree compensated by generous inows of foreign
aid. This was not the case in Ghana, which experienced very modest inows of foreign aid
after her 1972 default on foreign loans. As a consequence Tanzania experienced average
growth of GDP at around 4-5% per annum with a population growth of 2.9%. In contrast,
Ghanas economy did not expand at all while population grew at 2.6% per annum. Thus,
per capita growth was positive in Tanzania and negative in Ghana.
Both countries experienced signicant nominal growth in the pre-reform period. Yet,
while annual ination rates in Tanzania stayed at rather moderate levels of around 15%, they
reached very high levels of 50-100% and even more in Ghana. Similarly, the annual currency
appreciation in Tanzania was only 10% thanks to generous aid, whereas in Ghana it averaged
100%. During the rst years of the reform period both countries experienced average ination
rates of around 25% implying increasing ination rates for Tanzania (possibly due to declining
aid) and decreasing rates for Ghana (due to increasing aid) compared to the pre-reform
period. Since 1998 ination rates in both countries have come down to 10% or lower.
We also note that over the full sample period the large appreciation rates of the real ex-
change rates in the 1970s have roughly been compensated by the equally large devaluations
since mid-1980s. Similarly increases in ination rates in the rst period have been compen-
sated by the subsequent decreases in the second period. Overall, the real exchange rate has
depreciated somewhat in Tanzania and appreciated in Ghana during the period under study.
Tanzanian real GDP growth in the 1970s was partly driven by state led industrializa-
tion, mainly nanced by foreign aid, and by public investment in projects that improved
public welfare such as provision of better hospitals, schools and clean water. All this meant
higher employment and a more positive attitude towards the government. The widespread
skepticism shared by many people in Tanzania against the economic reforms can partly be
explained by the stronger legitimacy of the Nyerere government. It had after all provided
them with free health care, schooling and relative stability. At the same time, these positive
advances had been funded (or made possible) by generous aid ows. So when Tanzanias
donors started to withdraw support at the beginning of the 1980s, output started to decline,
in part due to a lack of imported inputs, which resulted in further under-utilization of pre-
viously created capacity (Bigsten and Danielsson, 1999). The fact that investment growth
was generally higher than GDP growth also suggests that at least some of the investments
made did not meet reasonable criteria for economic returns.
In contrast, the population in Ghana su¤ered signicantly under the adverse economic
conditions in the pre-reform period where high ination combined with the strong appre-
ciation of the currency caused investment to decline and consumption to stagnate. This
reinforced the commitment to economic reforms in Ghana. When the reform process started
in 1983 the macroeconomic picture changed considerably. Output expanded and grew at
an average annual rate of 5%, private consumption at an average rate of 5.6%, whereas in-
vestment rebounded at an impressive 9% annual growth rate. Only government expenditure
declined somewhat from previously 6% per annum to approximately 5%. The latter can
2See Ndulu et al. (2008) for illuminating background.
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be related to the strong devaluation of the real exchange rate and the fact that foreign aid
started owing into the country again.
The economic liberalization reforms no doubt had a positive e¤ect on the macroeconomy
in Ghana after 1983 and probably also in Tanzania. However, for both countries the growth
rates of investment were higher than those of GDP suggesting that investments may have
been characterized by poor quality and low productivity (see Bigsten and Danielsson, 1999;
Leechor, 1994; Husain and Faruque, 1994).
Thus, the structural reforms in the mid-1980s changed economic conditions signicantly
to the better in Ghana whereas growth rates in Tanzania essentially did not recover their
pre-1983 levels until around 1996. Why is this the case? Tsikata (2001) argues that one
reason was that the reform programme in Ghana was largely drawn up domestically and
that this contributed to a larger degree of domestic ownership than in Tanzania where
reforms were seen as being imposed from the outside. The slow pace of implementation in
Tanzania also reected the di¢ culty of undoing the countrys socialist legacy. Socialism was
much more embedded in Tanzanian society when reforms began than was the case in Ghana.
Tsikata (2001) also argues that domestic analytical capacities appear to have been stronger
in Ghana than in Tanzania, although the latter had a strong Department of Economics in
Dar es Salaam.
4 Model Specication
As the previous sections demonstrated, the last fty years have seen turbulent changes and
signicant reforms in both countries. To obtain reliable estimates of key macroeconomic
transmission mechanisms in Tanzania and Ghana is, therefore, a major econometric chal-
lenge. Extraordinary events usually result in large changes in the economic variables and
can be highly inuential for the results (Nielsen, 2008). It is, therefore, crucial that we are
able to adequately control for the most important economic and political reforms discussed
above. Also, over a period of such turbulent changes it is likely that the economic system has
adjusted di¤erently in the short and the long run which adds to the demands on the chosen
econometric methodology. As in JMT13 we have chosen the Cointegrated VAR (CVAR)
model which is tailor-made for the analysis of short-run and long-run structures in the data
and allows for an elaborate use of intervention dummies to control for extraordinary event.
Besides, it provides us with an analytical framework within which we can study similarities
and dissimilarities between the two countries. One could say that it allows us to study the
economic transmission mechanisms of each country through the same magnifying glasses.
The previous section demonstrated that for both countries, we can distinguish between
a pre- and a post-reform period during which macroeconomic transmission mechanisms may
di¤er. Such changes in regimes are not easy to reconcile with the assumption of constant
parameters in the CVAR model. Yet, if we split the sample there are too few observations
to apply the CVAR model. The full sample consists of only approximately 40 annual obser-
vations, and even with the full sample, a full-edged CVAR analysis is barely doable. This
poses an analytical challenge, which we address using dummies to account for extraordinary
events and broken linear trends for signicant changes in growth rates over the two regimes.
Some of the structural changes can be accounted for in this way; but at least some of the
coe¢ cients to the stochastic variables are likely to measure average e¤ects that in some cases
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may not be easy to interpret. In what follows we focus on the broad picture and accept the
inherent limitations imposed by our data.
4.1 The Cointegrated VAR model
Our CVAR model is similar to the one used in JMT13 where focus was on the long-run e¤ect
of aid on GDP, investment, private consumption and government consumption (all in real
terms). Here we extend the analysis by including the real exchange rate and the ination rate.
This allows us to dig deeper and check whether the previous atypical results for Tanzania
and Ghana are due to the ceteris paribus assumption that nominal and external factors in
the economy are constant (or at least stationary) while in reality they are nonstationary.
Our baseline model is a p-dimensional VAR model with two lags:
xt = xt 1 +  1xt 1 + Dt + "t; (1)
where  is a p  p matrix describing long-run relationships among the variables,  1 is
a p  p matrix of short-run adjustment coe¢ cients,  is a p  m matrix of coe¢ cients,
x0t = [yt; invt; ct; gt; aidt;pt; rext]; Dt is a vector of m deterministic components (such as
constant, trend and dummies), and "t  Niid(0;
) is a p 1 vector of error terms. Among
the system variables yt is real GDP, invt is real investment, ct is real private consumption, gt
is real government expenditure (excluding public health and education services), aidt is real
net ODA, rext is the real exchange rate relative to the US$, and pt is the ination rate.3
The real exchange rate is dened as rext = log(stp=p) where st is the domestic currency
versus the dollar rate and p=p measures relative consumer prices between the USA and the
domestic country. A rise/decline in the real exchange rate means depreciation/appreciation.
Small letters denote logarithmic values of annual observations and  is the rst di¤erence
operator. The e¤ective sample period is 1967-2009 for Tanzania and 1968-2009 for Ghana.
In its baseline form, model (1) is basically a description of the covariances of the data
given as a convenient formulation that allows us to discriminate between short- and long-term
macroeconomic responses. The econometric task, called the general-to-specic approach,
is to gradually impose statistically valid restrictions on the model parameters. This is a
guarantee that the data are allowed to speak as freely and as precisely as possible about the
macroeconomic mechanisms during the period in question.
If at least some of the variables xt are unit-root nonstationary then  in (1) has reduced
rank. This can be formulated as the hypothesis of cointegration:
 = 0 (2)
where ;  are p  r coe¢ cient matrices and r is the number of cointegration relations. If
 1 = 0 in (1) the system will adjust back to equilibrium exclusively through  after it has
3The ODA data is obtained from the OECD online data base. The data on yt; invt; ct and gt are obtained
from the Penn World Table (PWT) online data base (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2011). The data for the
real exchange and ination rates are taken from the IMF online IFS data base. We spotted some data
problems in the PWT data base. In 2005 government expenditure decreased in Ghana by 55% and increased
in Tanzania by 200%. These gures are not credible and inconsistent with the records in the WDI and
UN data bases. The same seems to be the case with a GDP growth of 14% in 2005 in Tanzania. Such
extraordinary changes are likely to be due to changing data denitions and we have have corrected these
records based on information available in the WDI database for Tanzania and in the UN statistics database
for Ghana.
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been pushed away from equilibrium by an exogenous shock. When  1 6= 0 the system also
adjusts to lagged changes, xt 1; so  1 becomes part of the adjustment dynamics.
The advantage of the CVAR formulation compared to a regression analysis in levels is that
by transforming the trending variables, xt; into stationary di¤erences, xt; and stationary
cointegration relations, 0xt; the usual multicollinearity problem is e¤ectively addressed. For
example:
(i) Multicollinearity between the x variables does not lead to imprecise estimates of the
cointegration relations, 0xt: This is because two variables are cointegrated only if they
share a common stochastic trend dened as the cumulation of all permanent shocks that
have pushed the variables out of equilibrium. While, for example, cointegration between two
unrelated random walks will be rejected with high probability, they may have a correlation
coe¢ cient close to one in small samples (Johansen, 2012). Also, the cointegration coe¢ -
cients are "canonical" in the sense of being invariant to increasing the information set, or to
changing the direction of minimization.
(ii) The removal of trends, either by di¤erencing or cointegration, is likely to make the
multicollinearity between xt and 
0xt almost disappear. When xt  I(1); xt and 0xt are
stationary, standard inference on (; 1;) applies for a given .
Thus, it is the explicit separation between short-run and long-run e¤ects, made possible
by cointegration, that makes inference from a CVAR model reliable. To illustrate, the
subsequent empirical models explain 65-80% of the annual variation of the macrodata for
Tanzania and 62-84% for Ghana. This allows us to answer economic questions of signicant
interest with a high degree of precision.
4.2 Controlling for Major Structural Reforms
To control for the e¤ect of extraordinary events on the variables that have caused long-run
trends to change and growth rates and equilibrium means to shift to a new level, we introduce
a number of deterministic terms, Dt; dened as:
Dt = 0 + 01Dsxx + 1t+ 11txx + Dpxx (3)
where 0 is a constant, Dsxx is a the step dummy, dened as (0,....,0,0,1,1,1,1...,1) with the
step starting in year 19xx; t is a linear trend, txx is a linear trend dened as (0,....,0,0,1,2,3,4,...)
and Dpxx is an impulse dummy dened as (0,....,0,0,1,0,0,0...,0), where xx stands for the year
19xx.
The CVAR captures the long-run and short-run structures in the same model implying
that the e¤ect of an extraordinary event will di¤er between the short-run dynamics and the
long-run relations. Hence, the coe¢ cients (0; 01; 1; 11; ) have to be decomposed into one
part belonging to the short-run structure and another belonging to the long-run relations
(Juselius, 2006, Chapter 6). Accordingly, the constant and the step dummy are decomposed
as 0 = 0+ 0 and 01 = 01+ 01: The  components, 0+ 01Dsxx; describe a change
in the equilibrium mean at the year 19xx and the other parts, 0+ 01Dsxx; a change in the
slope coe¢ cient of the linear trend at 19xx.
The broken linear trend, 1t = 1t and 11txx = 11txx; is restricted to the cointe-
gration relations to avoid quadratic trends in the data: Thus, the long-run relations (the
cointegration relations) can be trend-stationary around a linear trend with a changing slope
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coe¢ cient at 19xx. This gives us some extra exibility to capture features in the data that
would as already noted otherwise be di¢ cult to model given the econometric constraint im-
posed upon us by the limited number of observations over a period of very dramatic changes.
For Tanzania, the graphical analysis suggested that the slopes of the long-run linear trends
in GDP, private consumption, government expenditure, and investment were approximately
constant over the full period. The long-run trend in aid can also be assumed reasonably
constant provided we control for a level shift in the period 1973-1992 (when aid was roughly
100% above its long-run level). Since the increase in aid did not lead to a proportional
increase in GDP we have controlled for this expansion through the inclusion of two step
dummies, Ds73;t and Ds92;t; restricted to be in the cointegration relations. This is to safe-
guard against a bias of the estimated e¤ect of aid on the macroeconomy, in particular for
the second half of the sample when aid was no longer above its long-run trend. Finally, we
have included an impulse dummy, Dp85;t to control for the big devaluation of the Tanzanian
currency in 1985:
With these additions, the nal specication of the empirical CVAR model for Tanzania
becomes:
Xt = e0 eXt 1 +  1Xt 1 + 0 + '1Dp73 + '2Dp85 + '3Dp92 + "t (4)
where eXt 1 = (Xt 1; Ds73;t; Ds92;t; t; ) and e 0 = (0; 01; 02):
For Ghana 1983 denes a separation between a period of a stagnant economy with low
growth rates and a reform period with vibrant economic growth. As the graphical analysis
showed, only government expenditures exhibited linear growth in the rst more controlled
regime, whereas linear growth was resumed for all variables in the more liberal, post-reform
regime.
To control for the regime shift, we allow for a broken linear trend, 1t+ 11t83; in the long-
run relations combined with an unrestricted step dummy, Ds83: Together they are able to
account for the change in the growth rates and the shift in the equilibrium mean of the long-
run relations. Except for an unrestricted impulse dummy Dp72 to control for a large drop in
investment in 1972 due to Ghanas unilateral repudiation of external debt, the division into
a pre- and a post-reform period is su¢ cient to obtain a reasonably well-spcecied model.
The 1972 event also caused a decline in foreign aid and government investment.
For Ghana the nal CVAR specication is:
Xt = e0 eXt 1 +  1Xt 1 + 0 + 01Ds83 + '1Dp72 + "t (5)
where eXt 1 = (Xt 1; t; t83) and e 0 = (0; 1; 11)
Various diagnostic misspecication tests are reported in Appendix A table A.1 and A.2.
Normality is accepted for both countries and there is no signicant residual autocorrelation of
order one or two in either country. With the exception of private consumption for Tanzania,
there are no signicant AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) e¤ects. This
is reassuring as the CVAR model seems robust to moderate levels of ARCH e¤ects (Gonzalo,
1994).
After having controlled for the e¤ect of some of the most crucial institutional events
the specication of the CVAR model became statistically acceptable as can be veried from
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Table 1: The largest characteristic roots and maximum t-values of  for di¤erent values of r
Tanzania Ghana
r bmax tmax of r r bmax tmax of r
4 0:78 6:6 4 0:76 5:67
r = 5 0:82 3:9 r = 5 0:69 4:27
6 0:84 3:1 6 1:03 1:64
Table A.1 in the Appendix. Except for the ination rate equation the misspecication tests
are in general reasonable. As the ination rate can be shown to be weakly exogenous, this
moderate misspecication should not be of any concern. But, it needs to be emphasized that
Tanzania and Ghana were subject to many additional economic and political changes over
the sample period and the constant parameter assumption underlying the CVAR model is
unlikely to be completely satised. Since there are too few annual observations to split the
sample into a greater number of homogeneous regimes, it is important to keep in mind that
the estimated coe¢ cients describe average historical e¤ects between two very di¤erent pre-
and post-reform regimes rather than deep structural parameters. This is likely to cause large
standard errors of coe¢ cients, so we reiterate that some inferences are likely to be imprecise.
This is aggravated by data which are in some cases of poor quality.
4.3 Determination of the Cointegration Rank
The choice of cointegration rank determines the division into the r long-run equilibrium
relations towards which the system adjusts and the p   r common stochastic trends which
push the system away from equilibrium. Formally, the likelihood ratio trace test is used
to determine the number of the cointegration rank (Johansen, 2007). However, when the
number of observations is as small as in the present study, the asymptotic distribution of the
trace test su¤ers from both size and power problems. While the size problem can be solved
using the Bartlett corrected trace test statistics (Johansen, 2002), the problem associated
with low power to reject an incorrect unit root remains (Juselius, 2006, Hendry and Juselius,
2000). The latter makes the trace test less useful, in particular when the null of stationarity
(rather than nonstationarity) is more relevant from an economic point of view, as discussed
by Juselius (2006, Chapter 8.5).
Rather than just using the trace test, we therefore base the choice of rank on the char-
acteristic roots of the model, the signicance of the  coe¢ cients, and the graphs of coin-
tegration relations. In addition, and most importantly, we assess the statistical evidence
against a plausible economic scenario for the data generating mechanisms over this period:
A priori, we expect the system variables to be a¤ected by long-run trends associated with
trends in population and productivity proxied by the deterministic trends. We also expect
at most two stochastic trends, one capturing the nominal growth over the period, the other
describing medium long-run business cycle movements in the data. On this background our
preferred rank is ve and we shall assess the statistical evidence against this number.4
Table 1, reports the largest unrestricted characteristic root, bmax; for the given rank,
r  1; and the largest t-value of the r coe¢ cients, tmax; of the rth cointegration relation.
4For further methodological discussion, see Hendry and Juselius (2000) and Juselius (2006).
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The preferred cointegration rank, r; is as noted ve in both countries, but as a sensitivity
check we report as well the results for the closest alternatives, r = 4; 6. For Tanzania, the
information criteria are rather similar and hence not very informative: the characteristic
roots are quite similar in all three cases but the signicant error correction coe¢ cients of the
5th cointegration relation can be used to justify our preferred rank. For Ghana, the choice
of rank was more straightforward: both the characteristic roots and the signicance of error
correction coe¢ cients suggested a cointegration rank of ve. This reinforces our nal choice
of rank ve for both Tanzania and Ghana.
5 Pushing Forces
Figures 1 - 4 in Section 2 depicted graphically the decomposition of the macrovariables
into long-run deterministic trends and stochastic deviations from these trends. Section 4.3
argued that the latter are in most cases nonstationary implying that they can be treated
as medium-run stochastic trends around long-run growth trends. The interpretation is that
they describe the cumulated e¤ects of exogenous shocks to the economy that have pushed
the macrovariables out of equilibrium for prolonged periods of time.
5.1 The Common Trends Representation
The decomposition of the data into deterministic and stochastic trends is based on the
moving average representation of the CVAR model:
Xt=C
tX
i=1
("i + 0 + 01Dsxx;t + 'pDpxx;t) + (6)
+C(L)f"i + (0 + 01Dsxx;t + 1t+ 11txx)g+ ~X0 (7)
where, C = ?(
0
? ?)
 10? , C
(L) is a lag polynomial describing impulse response e¤ects,
~X0 is a catch-all for initial values, and
C = ?(
0
? ?)
 10? (8)
is a p p long-run impact matrix with rank p  r.5 The p  r common stochastic trends are
measured by 0?
Pt
i=1 "i and they a¤ect the variables by the loadings ~? = ?(
0
? ?)
 1.
The shocks "0t = ["y; "inv; "a; "rex; "c; "g; "p] are measured by the estimated residuals in the
CVAR model.
The coe¢ cients ? allow us to attach weights to the individual shocks that have cu-
mulated to stochastic trends in the data. By focussing on signicant coe¢ cients we can
get a broad picture of which shocks have been particularly important. For example, was it
an ination shock or a shock to government expenditure that pushed the economy out of
equilibrium? It is, however, important to note that the estimated results may be strongly
a¤ected by the choice of economic variables and the specication of the deterministic com-
ponents. Therefore, estimated stochastic trends are likely to change if the specication of
economic and dummy variables changes. Di¤erent sets of economic variables, xt; will explain
5A detailed discussion of (6) can be found in JMT13
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the variation of the system to varying degrees; and di¤erent sets of deterministic components,
Dt; will change the decomposition into deterministic and stochastic explanatory power. In
this sense, a residual is not an estimate of a structural shock, unless the model is complete,
something which is seldom the case. Therefore, we consider the empirical results to give us
one perspective on the two economies (Hoover, 2012) given by the choice of sample period
and statistical model, the latter dened by its stochastic and deterministic specication.
This is an important caveat when comparing our results here with the ndings in JMT13.
5.2 Interpreting the Two Stochastic Trends
According to the hypothetical scenario discussed in the previous section, the main exogenous
drivers in the period under study are, on the one hand, the deterministic trends capturing
long-term trends in factor productivity and population, and the stochastic trends capturing
persistent medium long-run movements in the economy, on the other. This section aims to
give the latter an economic interpretation.
The common stochastic trends, 0?
X
"i; and their loadings, ~?; are reported in Table
2. For both countries, one of the common trends essentially describes cumulated shocks to
the ination rate as conrmed by the test of weak exogeneity in the Appendix, Table A.2.
This implies that ination has not been equilibrium error correcting to the macroeconomic
conditions but, instead, has been exogenously determined by factors outside the informa-
tion set, such as excessive expansions of money supply to nance government expenditures.
Ghana, in particular seems to have used this option during the pre-reform period, whereas
generous aid to Tanzania during the Nyerere period lessened such a need.
The second common trend captures shocks to income relative to investment and private
consumption in Tanzania and to income relative to investment and government expenditure
in Ghana. In addition, shocks to private consumption, aid and the real exchange rate are
also signicant for Ghana. Altogether the second stochastic trend seems to capture medium
long-run movements in the real economy.
While the trends are somewhat similar between the two countries, this is not the case
with their loadings. In particular, the nal impact of an ination shock on the system
has been totally di¤erent for the two countries. The coe¢ cients are of opposite signs with
the exception of the coe¢ cients to government expenditure, which were negative in both
cases. More specically, an ination shock had a signicant negative nal impact on (i)
Tanzanian GDP (insignicant in Ghana), (ii) Tanzanian investment (positive in Ghana), and
(iii) Tanzanian aid (positive but barely signicant in Ghana). It had no e¤ect on Tanzanian
private consumption (positive in Ghana), and it caused an appreciation in Tanzania, but a
depreciation in Ghana. Altogether these results seem more plausible for Tanzania than for
Ghana. One reason is that the estimated nal impacts may represent average e¤ects over
two regimes, which in the case of Ghana were radically di¤erent.
In contrast, the nal impacts of a real shock on the system are more similar. For exam-
ple, the impact is positive for both GDP and aid in both countries and also caused a real
appreciation in both countries. Furthermore, a real shock had a negative long-run impact
on ination in Ghana but no signicant e¤ect in Tanzania. Regarding private consumption
and government expenditure the e¤ects di¤er in the sense that the former is negative in
Tanzania but positive in Ghana, whereas the latter is positive in Tanzania but negative
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Table 2: The common stochastic trends and their loadings
y inv a rex c g p
Tanzania
0?;1 0:00   0:12
[1:19]
  1:00
[NA]
~
0
?;1  0:53
[ 3:09]
 1:99
[ 3:54]
 0:83
[ 2:48]
1:23
[3:20]
  1:85
[ 1:67]
0:86
[3:44]
0?;2 1:00  0:30
[ 3:88]
0:08
[1:82]
  0:41
[ 3:97]
0:09
[1:39]
0:00
~
0
?;2 0:73
[1:85]
1:03
[0:80]
1:79
[2:33]
 1:52
[ 1:72]
 0:89
[ 2:49]
6:69
[2:61]

Ghana
0?;1 0:00    1:66
[1:74]
 1:00
~
0
?;1  1:07
[2:36]
0:34
[1:68]
 0:27
[ 2:07]
0:18
[2:00]
 0:16
[ 1:64]
0:39
[1:87]
0?;2 1:00  0:28
[ 1:96]
0:24
[2:90]
 0:25
[ 3:05]
0:90
[2:17]
 0:64
[ 2:84]
0:00
~
0
?;2 0:35
[3:62]
 0:77
[2:68]
 0:34
[ 1:83]
0:25
[2:01]
 0:39
[ 2:73]
 0:70
[ 2:33]
in Ghana. Thus, in both countries there seems to be strong substitutions between private
consumption and government expenditure, but in Tanzania it is the government expenditure
that has benetted from a real shock at the expense of private consumption. In Ghana it is
the opposite.
In addition, for Tanzania, the coe¢ cients to GDP and consumption are of similar magni-
tudes with opposite signs which can be interpreted to mean that a real shock has a negative
e¤ect on the consumption-income ratio or equivalently a positive e¤ect on savings. For Ghana
the coe¢ cients to GDP and government expenditure are similar with opposite signs which
suggests that a real shock has had a negative e¤ect on the government expenditure-income
ratio.
5.3 The Final Impact of Individual Shocks
To study the individual e¤ects, Table 3 reports the estimates of the nal impact of a shock
to each variable, b"x; on the system. As the ination rate was found to be weakly exogenous
and, hence, a common stochastic trend in itself, the last column of the table corresponds
roughly to ^?1 in Table 2. The remaining columns allow us to study the underlying sources
of the real stochastic trend in more detail.
We shall rst focus on the nal e¤ect of a shock to aid and to the real exchange rate
on the system. For Tanzania, the nal impact of a shock to these two variables is mostly
insignicant whereas for Ghana it is mostly signicant. For both countries the nal impact
of aid is positive for GDP (and strongly signicant in Ghana); and for investment (only
borderline signicant). While in both countries the nal impact of a shock to aid has been a
real appreciation of the currency, it has been positive for private consumption and negative
for government expenditure in Tanzania. The opposite is the case for Ghana.
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Table 3: The Long-Run Impact Matrix C for Tanzania and Ghanab"y b"inv b"aid b"rex b"c b"g b"p
Tanzania
yt 0:73
[1:85]
 0:17
[ 1:67]
0:06
[1:24]
  0:27
[ 1:61]
0:09
[1:63]
 0:53
[ 3:09]
invt        1:99
[ 3:54]
aidt 1:79
[2:33]
 0:46
[ 2:34]
0:14
[1:52]
  0:69
[ 2:10]
0:19
[1:86]
 0:83
[ 2:48]
rext  1:52
[ 1:72]
0:14
[1:52]
 0:12
[ 1:17]
 0:56
[1:49]
 0:19
[ 1:57]
1:23
[3:20]
ct  0:89
[ 2:49]
0:27
[3:04]
 0:07
[ 1:54]
 0:37
[2:41]
 0:07
[ 1:54]

gt 6:69
[2:61]
 1:83
[ 2:81]
0:52
[1:68]
  2:64
[ 2:42]
0:67
[1:93]
 1:85
[ 1:67]
pt    0:10
[1:21]
  0:86
[3:44]
Ghana
yt 0:35
[3:62]
 0:10
[ 1:87]
0:09
[4:10]
 0:09
[ 3:23]
0:39
[2:36]
 0:21
[ 2:59]

invt   0:19
[1:23]
 1:86
[1:66]
 1:07
[2:36]
aidt 0:77
[2:68]
 0:25
[ 1:51]
0:24
[3:55]
 0:18
[ 2:26]
1:25
[2:52]
 0:41
[ 1:69]
0:34
[1:68]
rext  0:34
[ 1:83]
  0:12
[ 2:85]
0:07
[1:45]
 0:75
[ 2:34]
  0:27
[ 2:07]
ct 0:25
[2:01]
 0:09
[ 1:22]
0:09
[3:01]
 0:06
[ 1:62]
0:52
[2:39]
 0:12
[ 1:12]
0:18
[2:00]
gt  0:39
[ 2:73]
0:12
[1:54]
 0:12
[ 3:59]
0:09
[2:32]
 0:62
[ 2:52]
0:21
[1:74]
 0:16
[ 1:64]
pt  0:70
[ 2:33]
  0:11
[ 1:59]
0:19
[2:33]
 0:55
[2:14]
0:39
[1:87]
For Ghana, the nal impact of a shock to the real exchange rate (a depreciation) has
been negative for GDP and private consumption, but positive for government expenditure.
In both countries, it has been positive for ination reecting the experience of increasing
ination rates together with an appreciating currency in the pre-reform period and decreasing
ination rates together with a depreciating currency in the reform period. The nal impact
of shocks to government expenditure is mostly insignicant for both countries, except for a
positive e¤ect on ination and a negative e¤ect on GDP growth in Ghana. This supports the
interpretation that government expenditures were nanced by monetary expansion, hence
increasing ination and lowering growth in the rst period, followed by a stricter monetary
discipline in the second period and declining ination rates and higher growth.
To summarize, by including the real exchange rate and ination to the ve variable
system of JMT13, the nal impacts of foreign aid on GDP growth and investment have now
become positive, albeit not all are highly signicant. Thus, the negative e¤ects found in
JMT13 are no longer present. The results also show that a shock to foreign aid caused the
real exchange rate to appreciate, suggesting presence of a Dutch disease e¤ect, and nally
that macroeconomic shocks have systematically had opposite e¤ects on private consumption
and government expenditure with opposite signs between the two countries.
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6 Pulling Forces
This section provides estimates of the role of real exchange rate persistence, ination and aid
in the macroeconomic transmission mechanisms. The idea is to pin down similarities and
dissimilarities between the two countries in order to study how the transmission mechanisms
have di¤ered and if possible relate the di¤erences to di¤erences in policy. We achieve this
by estimating an identied structure of ve cointegration relations (Johansen, 1995 and
Johansen and Juselius, 1994) and by studying how the system has adjusted when exogenous
shocks have pushed the system out of equilibrium (Juselius, 2006).
6.1 Identication of Irreducible Cointegration Relations
An identied cointegration structure consists of r irreducible cointegration relations, where
irreducibility implies that stationarity is lost if one of the variables is omitted from the
relation (Davidson, 1998). Hence, they contain exactly the right number of variables needed
to make the relation stationary, no less, no more. The results are interpreted with the
following caveats:
(i) A cointegration relation is expressed as a deviation from a long-run value and, there-
fore, corresponds to an equilibrium error. However, for easy of interpretation, we shall express
the cointegration relations in the form of equilibrium relations rather than equilibrium errors
when discussing the results.
(ii) Cointegration such only tells us that the variables have been co-moving over time
and does not say anything about causality unless combined with the adjustment coe¢ cients
 and economic identication is generally incomplete without combining the two. For ex-
ample, (x1;t   1x2;t)  I(0) tells us that the two variables are positively co-moving. If the
adjustment coe¢ cient 1; of x1;t is signicantly negative then x1;t has been equilibrium
correcting and if, in addition, 2 of x2;t is insignicant we may conclude that the direction
of causality is from x2;t to x1;t: If instead 2 is positive and signicant then both variables
are equilibrium correcting signifying simultaneous feedback. In general we choose to nor-
malize on a  variable that is signicantly equilibrium correcting in : This is di¤erent from
a traditional simultaneous equation model where causality is assumed by the choice of an
endogenous variable for each of the equations of the system.
(iii) There are usually several ways of identifying a structure of irreducible cointegration
relations. For example, if x1;t; x2;t; x3;t share one common trend, then x1;t   x2;t; x2;t   x3;t
and x1;t  x3;t are irreducible cointegration relations. Then the two relations in the long-run
structure can be identied by either (x1;t   x2;t; x2;t   x3;t) or (x1;t   x2;t; x1;t   x3;t).
(iv) The number of irreducible relations needs not be the same as the number of postu-
lated economic relations implying that a cointegration relation does not necessarily corre-
spond directly to a hypothetical economic relation. For instance, a linear combination of two
irreducible cointegration relations tied together with the  coe¢ cients can be closer estimate
of such a relation. In this sense, a generically identied structure of r irreducible cointegra-
tion relations, 0xt; can be thought of as building blocks that can be used to construct
meaningful economic relations with the help of the  coe¢ cients.
(v) A cointegration relation among three or more variables may not be easy to interpret
in terms of sign e¤ects. For example (1x1;t   2x2;t   3x3;t)  I(0) can mean that x1;t
is positively associated with both x2;t and x3;t: But the interpretation is also that x2;t is
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positively associated with x1;t but negatively with x3;t: This of course is similar to regressing
x1;t on x2;t and x3;t contra regressing x2;t on x1;t and x3;t; the di¤erence being that the
cointegration coe¢ cients are invariant to the choice of normalizing variable in contrast to
the regression coe¢ cients.
(vi) Deterministic components such as a linear trend or a dummy variable cannot in
general be associated with a specic stochastic variable unless the cointegration relation
contains just one variable. For example, if x1;t and a linear trend are cointegrated, then
trend-adjusted x1;t is stationary. Similarly if x1;t and a step dummy are cointegrated then
x1;t is stationary with a shift in the mean. But, if the cointegration relation consists of a
trend and several trending variables, say x1;t and x2;t;then this implies cointegration between
(x1;t   b1t) and (x2;t   b2t). If the cointegration relation consists of a trend, t; two trending
variables, x1;t and x2;t; and a non-trending variable, x3;t; then the interpretation is that x3;t
and the trend-adjusted variables (x1;t   b1t) and (x2;t   b2t) are cointegrated.
(vii) A cointegration relation among trending variables that does not need a trend can
often be given an interpretation as a deviation from a long-run economic steady-state relation,
provided it satises economic identication as dened in Johansen and Juselius (1994). If,
on the other hand, a cointegration relation contains a linear trend, it can often be given
an interpretation as a medium long-run relationship describing during long and persistent
business cycles often coinciding with di¤erent political and economic regimes.
(viii) A cointegration relation between a real variable and ination rate, for example real
exchange rate and ination, can be interpreted as a medium long-run adjustment relation
in the following sense: assume that pt + 1(st   pt   pt ) is a cointegration relation which
can be reformulated as pt =  1(st   pt   pt ) + ut where st   pt   pt = rext and ut is
stationary. If 1 < 0; then pt is equilibrium error correcting to the real exchange rate,
whereas if 1 > 0; then pt is equilibrium error increasing over the medium run.
With these caveats in mind we can proceed to interpret the empirical results in the next
section.
6.2 A Long-run Structure for Tanzania
The results for Tanzania are reported in Table 4 where insignicant adjustment coe¢ cients
have been replaced by the symbol  and are not commented on. According to caveat vii
cointegration relations 1-3 represent long-run steady-state relations, whereas 4 and 5 medium
long-run political business cycle relations.
Real GDP is equilibrium correcting to the rst relation (-0.12) and we interpret it as a
relation for real aggregate income (caveat ii):
yt
( 0:12)
= 0:62invt + 1:23pt + 0:28Ds;92;t: (9)
The results show that real GDP, investment and ination have been positively co-moving.
The positive ination e¤ect may seem puzzling but would be perfectly interpretable if we had
normalized on investment instead. In this case investment would have been positively related
to GDP and negatively to ination (caveat v). But since Table 4 shows that investment
was not signicantly equilibrium correcting to this relation, we have nonetheless chosen to
normalize on GDP (caveat ii). Both income and investment are trending variables that were
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Table 4: An overidentied long-run structure for Tanzania
Test of over-identifying restrictions for Tanzania, 2(7) = 4:69[0:86]
yt invt aidt rext ct gt inft Ds73 Ds92 _ t
1 1:00  0:62
[ 16:59]
       1:23
[ 8:50]
 0:28
[ 7:18]
 
1  0:12
[ 3:07]
 0:51
[2:02]
 0:36
[ 2:30]
 0:09
[ 1:31]
1:00
[4:62]

2   1:00  4:03
[ 52:85]
   0:79
[ 6:30]
5:11
[8:98]
  2:05
[16:43]
 
2  0:04
[ 2:78]
 0:28
[ 2:86]
  0:14
[ 2:32]
0:13
[4:52]
 
3  1:12
[ 7:31]
  1:00          1:00
[ 10:20]
0:54
[4:40]
3    0:63
[ 6:74]
  0:09
[ 3:64]
 
4 0:99
[8:07]
  0:22
[11:48]
1:00     0:52
[3:07]
       0:07
[ 15:12]
4  0:16
[ 2:71]
 0:86
[ 2:39]
  0:84
[ 3:63]
0:36
[3:45]
 
5         1:00 0:13
[8:13]
0:45
[6:94]
     0:04
[ 65:33]
5  0:28
[ 2:76]
1:39
[2:19]
 0:73
[1:80]
 1:69
[ 9:38]
 
cointegrated without needing a trend and (9) can therefore be interpreted as an average long-
run equilibrium relationship (caveat vi). The coe¢ cient 0.62 reects the fact that investment
grew faster than GDP in this period a puzzling result that might deserve further study. The
step dummy captures a positive shift in the level of GDP in 1992 or alternatively a negative
shift in ination or investment (caveat vi). The  coe¢ cients show that when GDP was above
its equilibrium value, the real exchange rate appreciated (a Dutch disease e¤ect), and aid
and government expenditure increased, whereas private consumption decreased (describing
strong substitution e¤ects between private consumption and government expenditure).
Investment is signicantly equilibrium correcting to the second relation (-0.28), hence it
is interpreted as an investment relation (caveat ii):
invt
( 0:28)
= 4:03rext + 0:79gt   5:11pt   2:05Ds;92;t; (10)
The estimates show that investment increased when the currency depreciated and when
government expenditure increased, whereas it decreased with increasing ination. Since in-
vestment and government consumption are both trending variables and no trend was needed
in (10), it is interpreted as a long-run relationship (caveat vi). The positive coe¢ cient to rext
and the negative coe¢ cient to pt is consistent with error increasing behavior between the
two in the medium run (caveat viii). The 1992 level shift can be associated with any of the
variables (caveat vi), for example a downward shift in investment or ination or an upward
shift in government expenditure or any combination of them. The  coe¢ cients show that
the real exchange rate has been error increasing, implying that, in the short run, the real
exchange rate has appreciated when investment has been above its equilibrium value. The
latter stands in contrast to the positive long-run relationship between investment and the real
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exchange rate implying that over the long run investment has increased when the currency
has depreciated. Finally, private consumption has adjusted positively to this relation.
The third relation is equilibrium correcting in aid (-0.63) and, hence, is interpreted as an
aid relation (caveat ii):
aidt
( 0:63)
= 1:12yt + 1:00Ds73t   0:54Ds92;t
The estimates show that aid has been increasing with increasing GDP. The two step dummies
show that the level of log aid roughly doubled in 1973 and halved in 1992. The  coe¢ cients
show that private consumption has fallen when aid has been above its long-run equilibrium
value.
Both the real exchange rate and the real GDP are equilibrium error correcting to the
fourth relation suggesting simultaneous feed-back (caveat ii). Since the real exchange rate
is more strongly adjusting we choose to interpret it as a real exchange rate relation:
rext
( 0:84)
=  0:99byt   0:22caidt:
where bxt stands for xt corrected for its long-run trend: Thus, the relation can be interpreted as
a medium long-run relationship describing that the real exchange rate has shown a tendency
to appreciate when GDP and/or aid have been above its long-run trend (caveat vi). This
lends support to the hypothesis that it was the expansion of foreign aid that smoothed
the way for the strong appreciation of the real exchange rate during the Nyerere regime. It
might be interpreted as evidence of a Dutch disease e¤ect of aid. The simultaneous feed-back
e¤ects can be given the following interpretation: when income is above its long-run trend the
real exchange starts appreciating, a real appreciation depresses income; when income starts
falling the real exchange rate starts depreciating, a real depreciation leads to increasing
income which causes the real exchange rate to appreciate, and so on. Finally, when the real
exchange rate was above/below its equilibrium value consumption increased/decreased and
investment decreased/increased.
Private consumption is equilibrium error correcting in the fth relation, which is therefore
interpreted as a consumption relation (caveat ii):
bct
( 1:69)
=  0:13g^t   0:45pt
It shows that trend-adjusted consumption has been negatively related to trend-adjusted
government expenditure and ination. Also this can be interpreted as a medium long-
run relationship capturing long business cycle behavior (caveat vi). The results indicate
signicant substitution e¤ects between private consumption and government expenditure in
line with previous results. The  coe¢ cients show that investment increased and real income
decreased when private consumption exceeded its equilibrium value.
6.3 A Long-run Structure for Ghana
The results for Ghana are reported in Table 5. According to caveat vii cointegration relations
3 and 4 represent long-run steady-state relations, whereas 1, 2 and 5 medium long-run
political business cycle relations.
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Table 5: An overidentied long-run structure for Ghana
Test of over-identifying restrictions for Ghana, 2(6) = 2:98[0:81]
yt invt aidt rext ct gt inft t83 t
1 1:00    0:44
[ 10:86]
         0:03
[ 15:91]
 
1  0:41
[ 2:91]
0:91
[2:21]
3:67
[4:96]
 2:21
[ 3:91]
 0:75
[ 3:94]
 1:11
[1:80]
2   1:00  0:44
[ 6:79]
    1:91
[11:65]
 1:40
[ 8:30]
 0:16
[ 15:76]
 
2  0:09
[ 2:23]
 0:76
[ 6:13]
   0:12
[ 2:09]
 
3    1:20
[ 4:88]
2:70
[8:49]
1:00     2:44
[5:55]
   
3  0:04
[ 2:50]
 0:28
[3:10]
 0:43
[ 6:19]
 0:10
[ 4:28]
 0:17
[2:22]
4  1:08
[ 47:39]
     0:03
[ 5:08]
1:00    0:15
[ 3:82]
   
4  1:06
[1:89]
5:02
[4:96]
 2:37
[ 3:06]
 1:21
[ 4:66]
0:89
[2:08]
1:51
[1:78]
5         1:36
[8:83]
1:00      0:11
[ 18:48]
5  0:48
[2:73]
 1:33
[ 4:15]
0:72
[2:95]
0:20
[2:40]
 0:60
[ 4:41]

The rst relation is equilibrium correcting to income and aid and, hence, describes si-
multaneous feed-back e¤ects (caveat ii). We have chosen to normalize on income, but could
equally well have used aid: byt
( 0:41)
= 0:44caidt
The relation shows that GDP and aid (both corrected for a long-run trend after 1983 as
they did not trend before 1983) were positively associated both in the pre-reform period
when declining aid led to a decade of no growth and in the reform period when aid started
owing into the country in larger volumes and growth resumed. We interpret the relation
as a medium long-run relation describing how real GDP and aid have been associated over
political business cycles (caveat vi). The simultaneous feedback of income and aid captures a
circle of increasing/decreasing aid generating higher/lower income and higher/lower income
resulting in higher/lower aid, and so on. The remaining  coe¢ cients show that the real
exchange rate appreciated when income was above its equilibrium value and that investment
increased and consumption decreased.
Investment is error-correcting to the second relation which is therefore interpreted as an
investment relation (caveat ii):
cinvt
( 0:76)
= 0:44caid+ 1:40pt   1:9bgt:
It shows that trend-adjusted investment has been positively associated with trend-adjusted
aid and ination but negatively with trend-adjusted government expenditure. Again this is
interpreted as a medium long-run relation describing behavior over the political business
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cycles (caveat vi). Ination and "excess investment" have been co-moving over the business
cycle and there has been strong substitution between government expenditure and invest-
ment and over the business cycle. The  coe¢ cients show that GDP and private consumption
decreased when investment was above its long-run trend relative to its determinants.
Altogether it was not possible to estimate a truly long-run Ghanaian investment relation.
The puzzling nding in Section 3 that investment grew much faster than GDP in the reform
period may suggest (similar to Tanzania) that investment deserves to be studied in more
detail. We therefore recall our initial caveats.
The third relation is equilibrium correcting to the real exchange rate but error increasing
in aid and ination. We interpret it as a relation for the real exchange rate (caveat ii):
rext
( 0:43)
=  2:70aidt + 1:20invt   2:44pt
The negative coe¢ cient to aid shows that increasing aid has been associated with an
appreciating currency (a Dutch disease e¤ect of aid) and increasing investment with a depre-
ciating currency. The negative relationship between the real exchange rate and the ination
rate implies error increasing behavior over the medium run (caveat viii). It signies that in
the pre-reform period ination was increasing while the currency was appreciating and that
in the reform period ination was falling while the currency was depreciating. Maintaining
an overvalued currency depressed growth in the pre-reform period, but may have prevented
the already very high ination rates to reach hyper inationary levels. But deregulating the
currency after the strong devaluations in the reform period does not seem to have made nom-
inal exchange rate more equilibrium correcting. Instead ination rates kept falling and the
currency kept depreciating, a result that is consistent with imperfect knowledge economics
(Frydman and Goldberg, 2007, 2012).
Additionally the  coe¢ cients show error increasing behavior in the ination equation,
which shows how close Ghana was to hyperination in the pre-reform period. The nding
that aid is also error-increasing shows that the more the currency appreciated and the more
ination increased in the rst period, the less aid was owing into the country. In contrast,
the more the currency depreciated and the more ination fell in the reform period, the
more aid was owing into the country. This is another way of saying that donors tended
to withdraw their aid when things went badly in the 1970s and did the opposite when the
economic performance improved in the 1980s. Finally, the  coe¢ cients of the income and
consumption equations show that both variables declined when the real exchange rate was
above its equilibrium value (i.e. had depreciated)
The fourth relation is equilibrium correcting in private consumption and ination (but
not very signicantly so) and is error increasing in the real exchange rate. We interpret it
as a private consumption relation (caveat ii):
ct
( 1:21)
= 1:08yt + 0:15pt + 0:03rext
This relationship implies that consumption relative to income (roughly proxying the
inverse of the savings ratio), is positively related to ination. When ination increases so
does consumption, implying that the savings rate has been declining with increasing ination.
Consumption relative to income is also positively related to the real exchange rate (savings
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have been low when the real exchange rate has been depreciating). That the real exchange
rate is error increasing is further evidence of the complex role the real exchange rate has
played in Ghana over this period. The  coe¢ cients show that when consumption was above
its steady-state level, investment, government expenditure and aid increased.
Government expenditure is error correcting and private consumption is error increasing
in the fth relation, which is interpreted to be a relation for government expenditure (caveat
ii): bgt
( 0:60)
=  1:36bct:
It is interpreted as a medium long-run relation describing behavior over the political
business cycle (caveat vi) and demonstrates (again) a strong substitution e¤ect between
government expenditure and consumption when both are corrected for their long-run trend.
The error increasing behavior of private consumption suggests that the latter was increasingly
depressed relative to government consumption in the pre-reform period and the other way
around in the reform period. The remaining  coe¢ cients show that aid decreased when
trend-adjusted government spending was above its steady-state, whereas real exchange rate
depreciated and real GDP increased.
7 Conclusions
Our empirical analysis revealed both di¤erences and similarities between Tanzania and
Ghana, which ultimately seem to be associated with the role of the real exchange rate,
the ination rate, and aid for the macroeconomic transmission mechanisms. Both countries
experienced a long period of real exchange appreciation in the 1970s and until the mid-
1980s. As the strong appreciation was not reected in a similarly strong macroeconomic
performance, both countries su¤ered from imbalances in various sectors of the economy. In
the end, very strong devaluations of the domestic currencies were unavoidable: Ghana in
1983 and Tanzania in 1985.
The fact that Tanzania was fortunate to obtain very large inows of foreign aid explains
why it was possible to maintain a strongly overvalued currency in the pre-reform period with-
out su¤ering from economic collapse in spite of apparent economic weaknesses. For Ghana
the opposite was the case. Foreign aid stagnated after the Ghanaian government repudiated
international debt, and the strong appreciation of the currency magnied existing structural
weaknesses in the economy. Government expenditure had to be nanced by monetary ex-
pansion, resulting in very high ination rates. Declining aid, very high ination rates, and
an appreciating currency was a disastrous cocktail for investment. While real GDP and pri-
vate consumption stagnated in this period, investment followed a negative growth trend, and
also real per capita income growth was negative. The empirical nding that investment was
negatively associated with government expenditure complements the picture of a military
government that was unable to promote real growth.
Due to generous aid inows, Tanzania experienced positive investment and GDP growth
both in the rst and the second period. In spite of the generous aid the growth rates were
not up to expectations which primarily seems to be due to the strong appreciation of the
currency. The results show that while real growth was strongly associated with investments
it was not a one-to-one relationship. The coe¢ cient to investment (0.63) suggests that some
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investments were not highly productive. As for Ghana, investment in Tanzania su¤ered from
strong real currency appreciation in the rst period and benetted from devaluation in the
post-1985 period and from occasionally quite high ination rates.
The fact that ination rates in Ghana soared in the same period, reaching almost hyper
inationary levels, suggests that money expansion went hand in hand with currency appre-
ciation. The fact that only government expenditure showed some growth over the full period
suggests that it was mostly nanced by expansions in the money supply. All this changed in
1983 with the adoption of structural reforms including a strong devaluation of the currency.
A common feature of the transmission mechanisms is strong substitution between private
consumption and government expenditure, but the e¤ects are opposite of each other in the
two countries. In the Ghanaian pre-reform period, government expenditure was allowed to
grow at the expense of private consumption. In the reform period, private consumption
increased while the government sector declined. In Tanzania, government expenditure gen-
erally appears to have been given priority over private consumption. For example, a shock
to aid was shown to be negative for private consumption while positive for government
expenditure in Tanzania, whereas the opposite was the case for Ghana
We now turn to the opening question whether the inclusion of real exchange rates (open
economy e¤ects) and ination signicantly a¤ects our conclusions regarding the long-run
impact of aid on the key macroeconomic variables in the two countries as compared to
JMT13. For Tanzania aid played the dual role of partly nancing imports, and partly
facilitating a real appreciation (and ination). The former promoted growth, while the
latter depressed it. This might explain why aid is not very visible in the Tanzanian results.
For example, the long-run impact of a shock to aid on the macrovariables was found to be
positive albeit only borderline signicant. In this sense, aid did not seem to play a strong
role as an exogenous driver. This is consistent with the nding that aid was mostly found
to be adjusting to the level of real income and the real exchange rate.
For Ghana aid seemed pivotal for real growth in both GDP and investment. The decade
of declining aid and essentially no growth in the 1970s and the catch-up after the initiation of
the post-1983 structural reforms period, when aid ows started increasing again, are a strong
indication of this. For Ghana the long-run impacts of aid were also found to be signicantly
positive. Altogether, the inclusion of the real exchange rate in combination with an improved
specication of the deterministic terms seem to be able to explain the negative Ghana results
in JMT13.
The next question is whether the e¤ect of the major structural reforms di¤ered for the
macroeconomic growth rates in Ghana and Tanzania. The results of Section 5 clearly suggest
that the growth rates in Tanzania remained essentially unchanged after the initiation of
structural reforms in the mid-1980s, whereas for Ghana the dismal growth rates of the
pre-structural reform period were replaced by strong macroeconomic growth. As the main
di¤erence between the two countries lies in the large inows of aid for Tanzania and lack of
aid for Ghana in the pre-reform period, ultimately the di¤erence in macroeconomic growth
seems to be associated with a di¤erence in the generosity of foreign aid giving. At the same
time, the results conrm the importance of maintaining a more balanced real exchange rate
for the overall transmission mechanisms of foreign aid. To some extent both Ghana and
Tanzania su¤ered from Dutch disease in the period under study.
Finally, the macroeconomic mechanisms during the two sub-periods were somewhat dif-
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ferent for Tanzania, but radically di¤erent for Ghana. The fact that with only 40 annual
observations we were not able to split the sample in two more homogeneous periods produced
some puzzling results. This was particularly the case with Ghana where the determination
of investment and the long-run impact of ination shocks were empirically di¢ cult to in-
terpret. Also, the results for Ghana provided evidence of several self-reinforcing feed-back
loops which produced a vicious circle outcome in the rst period, but a virtuous one in the
second. In this sense the relative abundance of aid ows in Tanzania and the lack of aid in
Ghana over the pre-reform period seems to dene the di¤erence between a reasonably stable
and an unstable economic performance.
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9 Appendix
Table A.1: Misspecication Tests
Ghana Tanzania
Bivariate tests Normality ARCH(2) Normality ARCH(2)
yt 7.85 [0.02] 0.69 [0.71] 3.70 [0.16] 0.11 [0.95]
invt 0.01 [1.00] 0.87 [0.65] 6.37 [0.04] 0.50 [0.78]
aidt 0.50 [0.78] 6.16 [0.05] 1.08 [0.58] 3.96 [0.14]
rext 0.70 [0.70] 0.99 [0.61] 1.67 [0.43] 3.09 [0.21]
ct 0.59 [0.74] 2.58 [0.28] 1.67 [0.43] 1.97 [0.37]
gt 1.78 [0.41] 8.04 [0.02] 3.81 [0.15] 0.01 [1.00]
 inft 12.99 [0.00] 8.04 [0.02] 6.92 [0.03] 11.94 [0.00]
Multivariate tests
Autocorr. LM(1): 2(49) = 63.20 [0.08] 2(49) = 72.18 [0.02]
LM(2): 2(49) = 38.65 [0.86] 2(49) = 44.49 [0.66]
ARCH LM(1) 2(784) = 825.36 [0.15] 2(784) = 817.02 [0.20]
Normality 2(14)= 20.46 [0.12] 2(14)=24.47 [0.04]
Table A.2: Test for Weak Exogeneity and Pure Adjustment
Test for Weak Exogeneity (A zero row in )
rank yt invt aidt rext ct gt inf t
Tanzania 5 2(5)
p value
27:96
[0:00]
21:30
[0:00]
27:48
[0:00]
28:83
[0:00]
40:00
[0:00]
22:17
[0:00]
3:55
[0:62]
Ghana 5 2(5)
p value
38:78
[0:00]
16:32
[0:01]
25:71
[0:00]
36:77
[0:00]
18:13
[0:00]
19:90
[0:00]
3:54
[0:62]
Test for Pure Adjustment (A Unit Vector in )
Tanzania 5 2(1)
p value
6:91
[0:03]
8:33
[0:02]
2:09
[0:35]
0:97
[0:61]
7:21
[0:03]
1:97
[0:37]
8:94
[0:01]
Ghana 5 2(1)
p value
14:33
[0:00]
3:52
[0:17]
13:33
[0:00]
10:78
[0:00]
12:16
[0:00]
8:91
[0:01]
9:08
[0:01]
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